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Abstract:
The recent enlargement of the European Union considerably increased the number of 
small member states. Of the 27 EU countries, 19 have fewer votes in the Council of 
Ministers than the EU average. They face structural disadvantages in uploading na-
tional policies to the EU level due to less bargaining power and less of the financial 
resources necessary for building up policy expertise and exerting influence via argu-
ing. This paper explores strategic disadvantages of smaller states in advocating their 
policy interests to the EU and comprehensively maps out their strategies to counter-
balance them. A comprehensive survey shows that some states are more active than 
others. In order to explain activity differences, three sets of explanations on learning, 
coordination mechanisms and legitimacy are developed and comprehensively tested. 
This  shows  that  small  states  are  most  active  in  negotiations,  if  they  have  non-
interrupted administrative work environments, motivated staff, policy expertise, been 
members of the EU for some time and experienced a learning curve while holding the 
office of the EU Presidency. By contrast, differences in specific or in diffuse support 
of EU integration do not influence how active small states are in shaping EU policies. 
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Introduction
1
Applying shaping strategies is an important precondition for success in international 
negotiations, in which actual voting is an exception rather than the rule. If a state does
not voice its positions accompanied by bargaining acts, good technical and scientifi-
cally sound arguments or convincing moral appeals, it cannot actively influence pol-
icy outcomes. In the first pillar of the European Union, states can influence European 
law via the Council of Ministers. The ministerial level of the Council seldom takes 
votes, and there is no voting in the working groups and the COREPER (Committee of 
Permanent Representatives) in which the bulk of decisions are actually taken. Hence, 
shaping activities, such as bargaining, are important to influence outcomes. Yet, while 
big states can rely on the shadow of votes and use their political leverage to influence 
directives and regulations, small states can hardly threaten others in working groups 
or the COREPER by eventual negative votes on the ministerial level. This cumulates 
into the wide-spread perception of small states that bigger countries have shaping ad-
vantages vis-à-vis smaller ones: “Big member states obviously at the end of the day 
carry more influence, because of the votes. If you have a proposal at the table and 
then three or four big member states come in one after the other and say we can’t 
agree to this then you begin to see the writing on the wall” (Interview Permanent Rep-
resentation#3, 10-04-08).
Against  this  background,  this  paper  analyses  the  following  questions:  Which 
structural obstacles do small states face in shaping EU policies and how do they cope 
with them? Which counterbalancing strategies do small states apply in order to influ-
ence outcomes in the first pillar despite their smallness? Are they equally active and 
how can we explain activity differences between small states? 
The most recent rounds of enlargements increased the number of small member 
states. Of the EU-27, 19 countries have fewer votes in the Council of Ministers than 
the EU-average. They are likely to face disadvantages in uploading national policies 
to the EU-level since they lack the political power to shape EU law in the same man-
ner as their bigger counterparts. Moreover, due to their lower GDP, the amount of fi-
1 This paper is part of a research project “Small States in the European Union. Coping with Structural 
Disadvantages”  funded  by  the  Irish  Research  Council  for  the  Humanities  and  Social  Sciences 
(IRCHSS). For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, I would like to thank Ole Elgström, 
Brigid Laffan, Daniel Thomas, and Cornelia Woll. Also, this paper would have not been possible with-
out the support of numerous staff members of small state ministries and permanent representations in 
filling out questionnaires and volunteering for interviews. I am extremely grateful to all of them. 3
nancial resources and personnel necessary for building up policy expertise and exert 
influence via arguing are more limited than in bigger states. Although these compara-
tive disadvantages might have implications for the effectiveness and legitimacy of EU 
governance, there is a gap in the literature: There are numerous excellent case studies 
on small states in the policy-shaping process of the EU (e.g. Laffan 2006, Bjoerkdahl 
2008), but rarely comprehensive empirical overviews on how small states seek to ex-
ert influence in the EU (e.g. Hanf and Soetendorp 1998). In order to contribute to a 
comprehensive assessment on small states shaping activities, this paper distinguishes 
between three power dimensions: voting/bargaining power, argumentative/ideational
power and moral/institutional power and examines the structural disadvantages for 
small states in each of these dimensions (II). It explores strategies to counterbalance 
these structural disadvantages (III), reports the results of a comprehensive survey on
small states activities (IV), discusses the empirical pattern (V) and develops and tests 
competing explanations of why some small states are more active than others (VI). 
The conclusion summarizes the major findings (VII), namely that human resources
(motivated experts, no brain drain, stable working conditions), and learning effects are 
crucial for the active involvement of small states in the EU policy-making processes, 
which in turn is an important precondition for successfully influencing European law. 
By contrast, legitimacy considerations cannot explain why some states are very active, 
while  others  less  frequently  use  counterbalancing  strategies  to  make  their  voices 
heard.
II. Small states in the EU 
The literature on small states draws attention to the fact that size is a social construc-
tion and can be defined alongside various dimensions, such as population, territory or 
economic  power  (Hanf  and  Soetendorp  1998,  Magnette  and  Nicolaidis  2005,
Thorhallsson 2006, Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006). For the purpose of this paper, the
distribution of votes in qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers is used to 
define whether a state is small or big, because this criterion matters regarding the in-
fluence on European policies. States with fewer votes cannot as easily form winning 
coalitions in the Council. Additionally, the Commission (Bunse, Magnette and Nico-
laidis  2005:  35-37,  44-45)  and  also  the  Presidency  (e.g.  Permanent  Representa-4
tion#30, 09-09-08) more often direct their attention towards big states because of their
stronger bargaining leverage.
Accordingly, this paper defines small states s countries which possess less 
than the EU-27 average of votes in the Council (12.78). 19 out of 27 members fall 
into this category. These are: Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxemburg, Slovenia, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Austria, Bulgaria, Sweden, Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Portugal. 
III. Power locations, structural disadvantages, and counterbalancing 
strategies
Small states have fewer votes, smaller staff and fewer financial means. Limited ca-
pacities translate into different types of structural disadvantages for shaping European 
policies. In order to analyse the latter, this section distinguishes between three differ-
ent types of power in the European policy-processes. In a further step, it identifies 
small state strategies to counterbalance structural disadvantages on all three dimen-
sions.
States can draw on three power dimensions in order to influence in the European day-
to-day policy-making process. These are voting and bargaining power, argumentative 
and ideational power, and moral and institutional power. 
Voting and bargaining power are characterized by the ability of states to use their 
political or economic weight to influence the decision-making processes through bar-
gaining threats, demands and concessions so that the outcomes reflect national inter-
ests  in proportion  to  their  bargaining  assets. Small  states  have fewer  votes  in  the 
Council, which decreases the likelihood for successful shaping. In addition, due to 
their more limited financial capacities, small states are less able to offer side payments 
to bigger states in exchange for support in a specific issue (c.f. Mattila 2004: 34-35). 
Having fewer economic capacities makes smaller members more vulnerable than their 
bigger counterparts. In the event that cooperation fails with other EU states, their al-
ternatives for unilateral action or cooperation outside the EU are more limited and this
leaves them worse off than bigger states. Finally, effective bargaining requires suffi-
cient personnel in the ministries to develop and present coherent negotiation positions 
in Brussels (Laffan 2006, Soetendorp and Hanf 1998). Compared to bigger countries,5
small states also run more easily into personnel shortcomings (Dosenrode von 1998: 
54).
Next to voting and bargaining power, states can influence EU policies based on 
argumentative and ideational power. Here, innovative ideas, knowledge and policy 
expertise as well as access to scientific expertise are crucial to persuade others from a 
particular position by arguing or framing (Bjoerkdahl 2008). However, since small 
member states possess fewer financial means, their chances to advocate their prefer-
ences to the EU through arguing and framing tend to be more limited. Fewer experts 
to prepare for negotiations makes it more difficult to develop well backed up positions 
(Kassim and Peters 2001: 300). Moreover, due to slimmer ministerial bureaucracies 
and higher workloads of their desk officers, small states’ contacts to European interest 
groups and epistemic communities are often less strong, so that they gain less back-
ground information, which could be used for successful arguing or framing. 
Finally, states can shape European decision-making outcomes through moral 
and institutional power. Drawing on moral and institutional resources, as evident in 
their  reputations  as  innovative  policy  forerunners,  as  pro-European  citizens,  or  as
holders of the Council Presidency, states turn into common good oriented norm advo-
cates and create normative pressures upon other states to agree to certain polices. Yet, 
even this third type of shaping power poses structural disadvantages to smaller states. 
Again, administrative and financial capacities matter (Laffan 2006). A lower number 
of experts in ministries back home and in national delegations in Brussels makes it
more difficult for a small state to systematically emphasize its superior policy exper-
tise, to construct a reputation as good citizen or to outline a European dimension, 
which is crucial for being regarded as a morally superior advocate of a particular pol-
icy. This is particularly hard for the less wealthier of the small states since they are of-
ten perceived as preferring lower regulative standards rather than costly ones (e.g. 
demanding environmental laws) (Permanent Representation #33, 26-11-08). 
Empirical studies show that small states are indeed often less successful in advocating
their policy interests to the European level. For example, the collaborative project ‘the 
European Union decides’ investigated eleven different EU decision-making models 
based on one data set (Thomson et al. 2006). This revealed that ‘powerful actors who 
attach most salience to the issues receive the largest concessions from other negotia-
tors’ (Schneider, Steunenberg and Widgren 2006: 305, similar Thompson and Hosli 6
2006: 21). This is due to an informally institutionalized consensus norm, according to 
which ‘powerful and intense actors are conciliated, even when they might be legally 
ignored’  (Achen  2006:  297).  In  line  with  this  an  official  stated:  “without  the  big 
member state consents some things just don’t go ahead. (..) Its pure power (..)” (Per-
manent Representation#21, 22-07-08).
Small states can sometimes exert influence through arguing. For example, a
study on the local election directive shows that high quality arguments can convince 
others, even if the point is put forward by a small state such as Belgium (Lewis 1998: 
497-8). Yet, small states are not always equally able to influence outcomes through 
arguments. ‘If a big member state makes  an argument, everyone listens carefully. 
Small states do not usually get so much attention’ (Permanent Representation#2, 10-
04-08). 
In the realm of moral power, case studies show that small states can also act as 
forerunners and moral entrepreneurs (e.g. Bjoerkdahl 2008). Yet, compared to big 
states, it is less likely that they have the resources to act as moral leaders in a broad 
range of issues because this requires that small states have sufficient personnel to ana-
lyse  the  positions  of  other  states  and  highly  specialized  experts  who  strategically 
frame proposals in terms of common concerns, highlight the European good, and em-
phasize the innovation. As an official from a small state stated: “We just don’t have 
the resources to be generally that inventive” (Permanent Representation#3, 10-04-08).
Although small states face structural disadvantages in all three power dimensions, 
they can engage in a variety of counterbalancing strategies, including bargaining, ar-
guing and moral-authority based strategies, in order to circumvent the drawbacks aris-
ing from fewer votes, less financial means and fewer personnel and make their inter-
ests heard.
Limited bargaining capacities and a low number of votes can be counterbal-
anced with two strategies: institutionalized coordination on a regional basis and stra-
tegic partnerships with bigger states (e.g. Permanent Representation #13, 7-07-08)
2. 
Examples for the former are the Baltic group, the Benelux, the Nordic cooperation
and the Visegràd group. With these institutionalized forms of intergovernmental coor-
2 Coalitions are important as well, but since coalition building usually takes place in all negotiations, 
encompasses big and small states, and tends to perpetuate differences in voting power (Permanent Rep-
resentation #9, 29-05-08), this paper does not focus on coalition-building as a small states strategy to 
counterbalance limited voting and bargaining power.7
dination the members can increase their collective bargaining leverage and shape EU 
policies more effectively than through unilateral action. One example of successful 
influence in the EU was the ‘Northern Dimension Initiative’ (c.f. Arter 2000b). One 
of the most well-known strategic partnerships is the Spanish-Portuguese one (Magone 
2001: 184), in which Portugal cooperates with its bigger neighbour in order to in-
crease its bargaining leverage in EU negotiations. These forms of institutionalized 
multi-  or  bilateral  cooperation  can  counterbalance  restricted  bargaining  or  voting 
powers, but presuppose homogenous interests within groups and between partners. 
Processes of arguing  are important in EU policy-making processes as  well 
(Elgström and Jönsson 2000). Disadvantages in argumentative and ideational power
can  be  compensated  through  direct  contacts  to  the  European  Commission. Small 
states then gain additional background information on the issue at stake to compensate 
for limited domestic capacities.
3 This could considerably save domestic costs for and 
time to gather expertise and might also help to speed up the domestic coordination 
processes for the formulation of national negotiation positions. Contacts to the Euro-
pean Commission can also be beneficial for small states because they can start prepar-
ing a position even before the draft proposal is dealt with in the Council if they know 
the content of a dossier in advance. Saving time for the national coordination of posi-
tions allows for longer periods of consultations with stakeholders and experts by ex-
tracting good arguments to defend national interests in Council negotiations later on 
(Permanent  Representation  #23,  22-07-08).  A  second  ideational  counterbalancing 
strategy is the prioritization of issues. Selective engagement allows small states to 
concentrate their limited financial and personnel capacities on the preparation of good 
instructions on salient issues backed up by sound arguments, while spending less time
on less important files.
4 Through prioritisation, scarce resources can be redirected to 
improve the scientific backing of positions by using external expertise so that the po-
sitions can be better defended (Interview Permanent Representation#9, 29-05-08). In 
addition, prioritization makes it easier to establish links to interest groups and epis-
3 “The Commission provides me with the information I need” (Permanent Representation#24, 23-07-
08).
4 “Unlike some of the bigger member states you will not be able to have an input into each and every 
issue that is discussed, and you have to choose the topic that you really want to have an impact on, but 
then you have to put all your effort into that one. And its generally also when you look at the response 
from the bigger member-states, the tendency is that you are taken more seriously, as a small member-
state, if you concentrate your efforts on particular issues.” (Interview Permanent Representation#47, 5-
02-09).8
temic communities, which can be used to obtain information on policy implications 
and on technical and scientific backgrounds (Interview Permanent Representation#9, 
29-05-08). Based on this, small states can construct persuasive positions, backed by 
up-to-date scientific knowledge. One example of setting priorities is Belgium’s con-
centration on the European Monetary Union (Maes and Verdun 2005). In addition, 
small states could use contacts to the European Commission as a channel of exerting 
voice and to increase the sensitivity of the Commission towards a particular small 
state interest (Interview Permanent Representation#38, 2-12-08). For example, by us-
ing direct access in safeguarding institutional equality among states (Bunse, Magnette 
and Nicolaidis 2005: 6, 22-23).
A third bundle of counterbalancing strategies relates to the moral and institu-
tional power dimension. Almost all states perceive small states as not particularly 
powerful and able to shape EU policies according to their national-interests (c.f. IV). 
Hence, small states can use their size as an asset for gaining influence masked in neu-
trality (Arter 2000a: 679, 683, Thorhallsson 2006, Tiilikainen 2006: 81-82). They can
act as ‘impartial mediators’ between different bigger states or defend common inter-
ests and, thereby, systematically promote their own policy preferences in the Council 
through the backdoor (Interview Permanent Representation #3, 10-04-08). An exam-
ple is Finland’s preparation of the decision to grant Turkey candidate status, a process 
during which Finland explicitly highlighted its neutrality (Bengtsson, Elgström and 
Tallberg 2004: 321). Another source of moral authority stems from the institutional 
opportunity structure of the EU Presidency. Firstly, the Presidency allows states to ac-
tively shape the European political agenda by drawing on the authority of the position
to set the agenda for the Union (Elgström 2003). Denmark, for example, used this of-
fice to promote their interests in the process of enlargement and promised financial 
means to candidate states without prior EU consensus (Bengtsson, Elgström and Tall-
berg 2004: 324). Secondly, small states can approach the Presidency of the day and 
emphasize particular problems which they might have in a dossier, hoping that the 
Presidency will draw on its institutional authority to accommodate their concerns.
5
5 “Quite a lot depends on the presidency, and they know exactly where the member states are and they 
can find a solution to your problem (..) And also explaining them when something is very important for 
you then they try to accommodate you. But you have few cards during the presidency; I mean few pos-
sibility to do this. You can ask them 2, 3 times, but not every time.” (Interview Permanent Representa-
tion#21, 22-07-08). 9
IV. Mapping Small States’ Activities
Small states have developed a variety of institutionalized and ad-hoc mechanisms to 
influence European policies. This section systematically maps out the importance and 
frequency of these activities based on a series of questionnaires on states’ strategies in 
the EU. In order to create a representative dataset, 327 questionnaires were circulated
among small member states between October 2007 and August 2008. The survey con-
trolled for policy-variation and was given to representatives in economic ministries, 
environmental/agricultural ministries,
6 foreign ministries and the permanent represen-
tations in Brussels. Depending on the response rate of the first round, each minis-
try/permanent representation received between four and fourteen forms in a maximum
of four rounds. The response rate was 36 percent. The responses cover all policy 
fields  for  each  state  (environment/agriculture,  economy,  coordination 
(MFA/Permanent Representations)).
7
The below figure maps the country averages of activities standardized on a 0-4
scale. This scale makes answers comparable across strategies and captures differences 
and similarities between small member states without exaggerating dissimilarities. 
6 Not every small state has different ministries for agricultural and environmental policy. 
7 The country responses were as follows: AT 5, BE 4, BG 16, CY 6, CZ 6, DK 6, EE 5, FI 6, GR 5, HU 
5, IE 5, LT 5, LU 5, LV 6, MT 6, PT 6, SE 7, SI 7, SK 6. Most ministries returned questionnaires rep-
resenting individual perceptions, while some held internal meetings on the responses and submitted an 
aggregate response.10
Table 1 Mapping of Small States Strategies (means)
Country
Strategic 
bilateral 
partnerships 
to big coun-
tries
Institutional-
ized coordi-
nation
Contacts to 
the Com-
mission
Prioritiza-
tion of is-
sues
Presidency 
as opportu-
nity struc-
ture for na-
tional inter-
ests
8
 “Honest 
brokerage”
AT 1.82 0.00 3.08 3.29 1.60 1.66
BE 2.19 3.33 3.09 2.00 1.66 2.00
BG 0.82 0.00 1.97 2.47 1.64 0.48
CY 0.27 0.00 2.22 2.51 1.20 0.22
CZ 1.03 2.00 1.90 3.26 1.33 0.67
DK 2.64 2.66 3.20 3.29 2.67 3.33
EE 0.25 2.66 2.47 1.90 1.50 0.33
FI 1.16 2.66 2.38 3.24 1.67 1.77
GR 0.82 0.00 2.47 2.50 2.40 0.67
HU 1.33 2.00 2.47 2.86 2.00 0.00
IE 3.66 0.00 3.84 2.57 3.33 2.66
LT 0.96 2.66 1.43 2.86 0.50 0.89
LU 3.28 3.33 2.61 3.24 2.00 2.22
LV 0.27 2.66 2.06 2.90 1.67 0.53
MT 2.46 0.00 1.90 2.80 2.00 0.44
PT 1.29 0.00 2.51 2.69 2.40 1.60
SE 1.61 2.66 2.89 2.71 1.67 2.13
SI 2.31 0.00 2.44 2.57 2.00 2.00
SK 0.08 2.00 2.22 2.86 2.67 0.33
* frequency of usage/importance of strategies
9
0 1 2 3 4
Never Seldom Occasionally Frequently Very frequently
If we add up the activity scores for the six strategies for each member state,
10 we can 
rank them according to their overall activity level (figure 2). This reveals that Den-
mark is the most active state followed by Luxembourg, Ireland, Belgium, Sweden and 
Finland as well as that Cyprus is the least active state, followed by Bulgaria, Greece,
Estonia and Lithuania.
8 Since not every state has yet held the Presidency and since states can also approach the Presidency in 
order to make the latter aware of their problems, the question aimed for its importance for pursuing na-
tional interests through the Presidency, rather than they way states use the office once they hold it. 
9 The variables are based on answers or on combinations of answers to the questionnaire and are coded 
to a 0-4 measure, reflecting categories from “never” to “very frequently”. 
10 Adding the activity scores is possible, since the groupings of activity leaders, middlefield players and 
activity strugglers remain mainly robust across the six strategies. In addition, cross-checking the sur-
vey-based ranking in a selection of interviews with Permanent Representations (asking them to evalu-
ate themselves in relation to others), ministries, and the European Commission revealed that the survey 
shows representative results with Hungary being the only exception (rated a bit lower than the survey 
shows).11
Figure 2: Frequency of Strategies (sum of strategies means by country)
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What pattern can be observed? The next section discusses the variation within strate-
gies, states and policy areas based on the survey insights and complemented by inter-
views and secondary literature in order to give a comprehensive picture of small states 
activities.
V. Pattern of Strategies
None of the small member states is at the extreme upper end of the activity scale. Out 
of a maximum of 24 (6*4) activity points, Denmark scores highest with 17.78 points, 
followed by Luxemburg with 16.67, Ireland with 16.54, Belgium with 14.67 points, 
Sweden with a score of 13.67 and Finland with 12.87 points. Hence, even the most ac-
tive among the small states do not reach extremely high activity scores. Moreover, the 
mapping also clearly shows that there is variation between states. In fact, the small 
states can be grouped into three clusters. Next to the small states activity leaders, we 
have many middlefield players (Austria, Slovenia, Hungary, Portugal, Czech Repub-
lic, the Slovak Republic, and Latvia) and a group of relatively inactive states com-
posed of Cyprus with 6.43 activity points, followed by Bulgaria (7.38), Greece (8.86),
Estonia (9.11), Lithuania (9.29) and Malta (9.60). 12
Strategic bilateral partnerships with powerful states are less common than multilateral 
institutionalized regional coordination. Partners of bilateral coordination exchange in-
formation on their positions and trade support across issues. Smaller partners tend to 
side with bigger ones, when they are not strongly interested in a particular issue and 
thereby hope to become supported by the bigger partner in other issues (Permanent 
Representation#39, 3-12-08). There are several issue-specific partnerships, such as 
between Ireland and France in agricultural policies or Austria and Germany the trans-
port area (Luif 1998: 126). Ireland, Luxemburg, Denmark, Malta, and Slovenia use 
bilateral  partnerships most  frequently,  while  Slovakia,  Estonia,  Cyprus  and  Latvia 
hardly ever rely on this counterbalancing strategy. With the exception of Malta, which 
due to its history has medium strong and occasionally used ties to the UK, and to a 
lesser extent Slovenia, new small members rely less on bilateral partnerships with 
bigger states than old member states. Recently acceded states have difficulties to find 
bigger allies in order to support their positions in bargaining processes (Permanent 
Representation#34, 27-11-08, Nikodem 2004: 1). Hungary, the Czech Republic and
the Slovak Republic are geographically close to Poland. Yet, there are no frequent bi-
lateral intergovernmental contacts to coordinate joint EU positions with this big state, 
due to their limited number of common EU policy preferences (Permanent Represen-
tation#40, 3-12-08, Hejsek 2003: 2-3). In addition, the survey showed that some of the 
new small member states tend to establish bilateral contacts to the old small rather 
than old big countries, such as Cyprus with Greece, Czech Republic with the Slovak 
Republic, or Slovenia with Austria.
Multilateral institutionalized coordination takes place on the basis of geographic prox-
imity. There are two Nordic, one Central and one Eastern European region, in which 
states established common institutions to identify and to eventually promote common 
interests. These regional forums differ significantly in their degree of institutionaliza-
tion, the coherency of shared member states interests and the frequency to which the 
platforms are used to increase the bargaining leverage and voting power in EU nego-
tiations. The strongest form of regional multilateral coordination is the Benelux group 
composed of Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. The Benelux platform has of-
ten been evoked to strengthen the voice of its members in the EU policy-making 
processes (Benelux General Secretariat 2007). In particular in the early years of Euro-
pean integration it allowed its three members to face the big three, Germany, France 13
and Italy, as one big counterpart. Regional multilateral coordination takes also place 
in  the  North.  Denmark,  Finland  and  Sweden  enhance  their  bargaining  and  voting 
powers in the EU through the Nordic cooperation, which also includes the non-EU 
members Norway and Iceland. The Nordic cooperation allows for intergovernmental 
and parliamentary policy consultation and coordination in various constellations (e.g. 
The Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers 2003).
11 It is relatively often 
used (e.g. The Nordic Council and Nordic Council of Ministers 2007). The Nordic 
cooperation is a less institutionalized than the Benelux and more flexible, as it allows 
(in the form of the Baltic-Nordic cooperation) for multilateral relations to Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. The latter form the Baltic group, which is also institutionalized 
to a medium extent:
12 Meetings are often regarded as successful coordination devices, 
but take place in an irregular manner, depending on pre-existing shared policy inter-
ests  (Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  Latvia  2003:  2,  Baltic  Assembly  2007).  The 
members of the Baltic group often coordinate with the Nordic group (known as the 
Nordic-Baltic  cooperation).  Finally,  the  Visegràd  group  is  composed  of  Hungary, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland. It is less strongly institutionalized than the 
other platforms of regional coordination. Since the four members have few common 
interests,  the  V4  is  not  the  primary  loci  of  collaboration  between  its  members 
(Dankova 2003: 3) and not very frequently utilized (Hejsek 2003: 1). Finally, Austria, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia do not use this coun-
terbalancing strategy as a means to increase the collective bargaining leverage.
The prioritization strategy, by which states rank issues according to their domestic 
importance, allows concentrating limited resources on policies with high saliency. In 
addition, it can generate additional expertise, since the desk officers have the time to 
drawing on a variety of domestic and transnational expert networks, interest groups or 
epistemic communities for important issues. High quality arguments supported by up-
to-date data, in turn, are more likely to persuade other actors in negotiations. The sur-
vey  showed  that  foreign  ministries  and  permanent  representations  in  Brussels  are 
dealing with a high number of issues at once, whereas selective engagement is more
11 Its institutional structure encompasses the Nordic Council (1952) as consultative platform and the 
Nordic Council of Ministers (1971), which operates as agenda setter and also implements decisions of 
the Nordic Council.
12 It encompasses intergovernmental consultation and coordination and occasional contacts between the 
three parliaments (Baltic Assembly 2007).14
common for line ministries. Also, Denmark, Austria, the Czech Republic, Luxem-
burg, and Finland systematically focus their energy on a limited number of issues of
higher importance to their country. Other countries, such as Estonia, Belgium, Bul-
garia, Cyprus, and Greece, have lower prioritization rates and adopt more comprehen-
sive approaches to EU negotiations. 
Through contacts to the European Commission, small states  gain additional back-
ground information which can be used for influence via arguing. In general, this strat-
egy is very prominent and more frequently used by the permanent representations 
than by line ministries. The intensity of contacts between national departments and the 
European Commission varies also between states. Overall, old small members have 
more frequent interactions with the Commission, than the group of recently acceded 
states.  Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia also seek to establish very close ties to the 
European Commission, but have not yet reached frequency levels of the most active 
old member states. Lithuania, Malta, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria contact the 
Commission least often, but still tend to have several contacts a month on average
(Permanent Representation#34, 27-11-08). 
The survey also asked for the perception of whether small states are more often im-
partial than big states in the Council of Ministers. This revealed that small states per-
ceive themselves indeed as considerably more neutral than big states. If small states 
are often regarded as impartial or too small to effectively shape European policy out-
comes according to their national interests, they might act as mediators between big-
ger states. In using an ascribed veil of neutrality, small states could seemingly act as 
“impartial brokers”, while they selectively advance those positions which are more 
favourable to themselves. Yet, the survey and interviews show that not even generally 
very active states, such as Belgium or Ireland, turn very often into ‘honest brokers’.
The  Presidency  offers  another  window  of  opportunity  to  pursue  national  interests 
masked as European concerns. States can either approach the Presidency of the day in 
order to profit from its agenda setting institutional power or they can use this office 
directly when holding it. Case study insights on Denmark, Finland and Sweden indi-
cate that older members are less neutral and more frequently pursue national self-
interests through office Presidency than newer states, which are more sensitive to cre-15
ate and protect a good reputation in the EU (Bengtsson, Elgström and Tallberg 2004: 
319). The survey also found that Ireland, Denmark, Portugal, and Greece frequently 
promoted their preferences through the office of the Presidency and also showed that
there are differences between the groups of old and new small states –with Slovakia 
as a notable exception of a new state with approximately an equal number of frequent 
contacts to the Presidency as Denmark. On the other end of the spectrum, Lithuania, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Austria, Bulgaria, Belgium, Latvia, Finland, and 
Sweden do not regard the Presidency as a good window of opportunity for pursuing 
national interests and use this strategy less often.
Finally, while there is much variation between states, the activity scores hardly vary 
across policy fields. Environment and agriculture ministries as well as economic min-
istries have average activity scores of 1.80 and 1.85 respectively. Surprisingly, the 
foreign ministries, together with permanent representations, have prominent roles in 
the coordination of EU policies and the negotiations in working group, COREPER 
and the ministerial level are on average only slightly more active (mean of 1.95). 
VI. Explaining the Differences in the Activity Pattern: Activity Lead-
ers, Middlefield Players, and Stragglers
Small states commonly face structural disadvantages in day-to-day negotiations in the 
first pillar, since they all have less voting power and less economic bargaining power. 
Yet, they differ in their responses to these structural disadvantages. There are activity
leaders (DK, LU, IE, BE, SE, FI), middlefield players (AT, SI, HU, PT, CZ, SK, LV)
and stragglers (CY, BG, GR, EE, LT, MT).
How can we explain that some member states are more active than others? 
Why do Denmark, Luxemburg, Ireland, Belgium, Sweden and Finland form a leader 
group, while Cyprus, Bulgaria, Greece, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta lag behind? In 
order to shed some light on these questions, this section develops three sets of hy-
potheses on domestic coordination, learning processes, and the role of legitimacy and 
empirically tests them.
Hypotheses on coordination capacities, learning, and legitimacy16
Coordination capacities are important to protect and to pursue national interests in the 
EU multi-level system (Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000: 5). The very precondition 
for active engagement in the European policy-making process is to develop national 
positions and negotiation instructions in due time. If states have no position at all or 
only develop one in later stages of negotiations, their representatives in the working 
parties or the CORPER have less opportunities to apply counterbalancing strategies. 
To allow for high activity levels, it is essential that the domestic coordination of na-
tional positions on EU dossiers works smoothly. Disruptions and delays can be caused 
by a high number of domestic veto players and by cooperation problems between the 
permanent representations in Brussels and the individual ministries back home (the re-
structuring of ministries, lacking ownership in ministries and permanent representa-
tions, emphasis on domestic rather than on European issues of the desk officers in the 
ministries). Accordingly, the first coordination hypothesis expects that the activity-
level of states is the higher, the less obstacles domestic co-ordination procedures face. 
Smooth co-ordination procedures produce instructions in time for the beginning of 
working group negotiations or for the COREPER and are the very precondition for 
every small shaping activity. Delays in the production of instructions, by contrast, 
hinder delegations to adopt many means to make their voices heard in negotiations.
The second coordination hypothesis focuses not on the speed to which posi-
tions are produced, but on the quality of positions. If experts are lacking concerning 
an issue at stake, for example because of a brain drain into the private sector, minis-
tries have problems to identify the problematic issues in dossiers and formulate nego-
tiation positions that reflect national interests. In particular if additional expertise can-
not be gained through contacts to the civil society or stake holders, positions risk to be 
very vague. In all cases in which a clearly formulated national ideal outcome or at 
least a notion of which items are problematic are absent, negotiators cannot use shap-
ing strategies to pursue national preferences. This cumulates in a lower activity level. 
Hence, the second coordination hypothesis is: The higher the expertise on technical 
issues is, the more active are states.
Secondly, learning approaches content that the amount of resources a required for a 
particular activity declines, the more often this activity is performed (Alderson 2001). 
Repeated action builds up knowledge to avoid failures and expertise on how to do 17
things best (Agyris and Schön 1980). If learning occurs over time, transaction costs 
decline and scarce financial and personnel resources can be saved. The EU multi-level 
system is complex and demanding – particularly for new member states (Kassim, Pe-
ters and Wright 2000: 1, 6). Learning curves can be steep. It might take new members
a while to get accustomed to the EU’s policy-making practises, collect experience, 
learn about shaping challenges, and expand their counterbalancing shaping strategies. 
Being part of the club for longer durations enables ministries and permanent represen-
tations not only to learn how the EU bureaucracy works but also to develop and per-
fect techniques to advance their interests. This learning curve helps to save scarce re-
sources and allows for more of the bargaining, arguing or moral/institutional activi-
ties. Hence, according to the first learning hypothesis, the longer states that have been 
part of the EU, the more active they are in shaping European policies.
There is a second variant of the learning hypothesis, which focuses on the ef-
fect of having had a Presidency. The office of the Presidency places special require-
ments on bureaucrats, diplomats and politicians: they have to accustom themselves 
with the EU, establish new and intensify existing contacts to other states and Euro-
pean institutions, and learn how to work within and across the different levels of the 
multi-level system. Through these learning effects, states can save transaction costs in 
day-to-day policy making even after the office of the Presidency passed on to the next 
state. Hence, states that already experienced a Presidency tend to be more active in 
shaping policies than those who have not yet had this office.
The final set of hypotheses focuses on the role of legitimacy for the decision of small 
states to invest scarce resources in order to engage in shaping strategies. Considera-
tions on the appropriateness (or the lack thereof) of EU legislative competencies as 
well as on the potential gains from European policy-making can influence the motiva-
tion of governments, diplomats and civil servants to actively engage in EU negotia-
tions.  Based  on  Easton’s  distinction  between  diffuse  and  specific  support  (Easton 
1965) we can develop two hypotheses. Firstly, one can assume that states with low 
levels of general public support of the EU have a strong motivation to use counterbal-
ancing strategies to make their voice heard in EU negotiations. Governments in EU
sceptic states cannot afford to be blamed as inactively accepting EU legislation. In or-
der to avoid domestic losses in their reputation and in electoral support, governments
seek to ensure that EU legislation does not ‘harm’ their domestic legislation through 18
engaging in shaping activities. Hence, the lower the public support for EU member-
ship, the more active a state should be. Secondly, specific support can matter as well. 
Active engagement could help to gain in relation to specific policies, while passivity 
reduces the chances to successfully upload domestic preferences to the EU. Hence, if 
states  perceive  themselves  as  gaining  a  lot  from  EU  membership,  political  actors 
might be especially motivated to invest available resources in actively influencing 
outcomes. On the contrary, if states tend to regard the EU not strongly as an arena in 
which they can win something, politicians, diplomats and attachés might be less moti-
vated to invest in shaping and rather save their scarce resources for domestic policy-
making in order to safeguard electoral support. The hypothesis on specific support, 
therefore,  states:  The  more  widely  a  state  perceives  itself  as  benefiting  from  EU 
membership, the higher is its activity level.
Testing the Coordination, Learning, and Legitimacy Hypotheses
The first coordination hypothesis focuses on potential disruptions of domestic proc-
esses to develop national positions in time for the beginning of negotiations. Delays 
can be caused by involved veto players and by disruptive or uncooperative adminis-
trative working conditions and are expected to translate into fewer shaping activities. 
Next to the affected lean ministries and coordinating institutions, parliaments 
can be involved in the development of national positions. In all states, either the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs or an EU unit in the office of the Prime Minister is operating 
as coordinator overseeing the domestic processes. However, the involvement of the 
parliaments differs. While Denmark and Sweden and to a lesser extent also Finland
have strong parliaments that can delay and substantively alter outcomes of domestic 
coordination, the parliaments in the other activity leaders and in the strugglers group 
have fewer competencies (usually obtaining information) and cannot turn into veto 
players. Hence, the number of involved actors does not causally impact the speed of 
domestic coordination and does not influence the activity level of states. 
The second element of the first hypothesis finds stronger support: In many of 
the newer less active members, administrative reforms and fluctuation in ministries 
disrupt working relationships and places difficulties on coordination processes leading 
to delays. An official argued “The difficulty…many factors…I am trying to think. 
Usually the first factor is the lack of administrative capacity but I don’t think that 19
that’s the most important one. We really have a small administrative capacity and we 
are creating this administrative capacity and we have very little experience. But  I 
think that the most important factor is a historical one: The lack of continuity and co-
herence in our policymaking” (Permanent Representation#24, 23-07-08). In addition, 
the motivation of experts in ministries to participate in domestic coordination proce-
dures is relatively low in the group of least active member states, because they often 
tend to prioritize domestic affairs over European affairs and since ministries do not 
cooperate well with each other (Interviews Permanent Representation#23, 22-07-08,
Permanent Representation #24, 23-07-08). Unlike most of the laggard states, the ac-
tivity leaders were not subject to recent internal reforms that disrupted working rela-
tionships within ministries as well as between ministries and permanent representa-
tions. All activity leaders emphasised they have low fluctuation in the ministries and 
do not face problems arising from limited awareness of the importance of EU-related 
work (e.g. Permanent Representation#13, 7-07-08, Permanent Representation#14, 9-
07-08, Permanent Representation#15, 10-07-08). 
As expected, activity leaders tend to have positions for the beginning of work-
ing group level negotiations and can engage in shaping activities from early on: “I 
would say we usually have instructions before a meeting” (Permanent Representa-
tion#9, 29-05-08). By contrast, the group of least active countries frequently faces de-
lays in the production of negotiation instructions: “We are not always at or best in the 
meetings, we are not prepared, there is no instructions for us.” (Permanent Represen-
tation#34, 27-11-08). As expected, delayed instructions decrease the amount of ap-
plied counterbalancing activities: “If you than have no position you cannot negotiate 
and have to be silent” (Permanent Representation#1, 10-04-08). Low activity levels, 
in turn, reduce the chances to successfully influence European policies: “And the con-
sequence is that we, for some dossiers we are, we have our position only at a very late 
stage of the negotiation and then it might be already too late to influence something.” 
(Permanent Representation#34, 27-11-08).
The second coordination hypothesis focuses on the quality of positions as a 
precondition for active engagement in EU negotiations. Cyprus, Bulgaria, Greece, Es-
tonia, Lithuania and Malta as the group of least active states, all face shortcomings in 
expertise, in particular for very technical matters (e.g. Permanent Representation#34, 
27-11-08). This is particularly severe in Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania, in which a 
brain drain from the public into the private sector (where higher wages are paid) re-20
duces the number of experienced ministerial staff (e.g. Permanent Representation#33, 
26-11-08, Permanent Representation#21, 22-07-08).
13 Malta has a proactive approach 
to consult the civil society (if organised, which varies strongly between sectors) dur-
ing the  process  of  domestic  coordination  (Permanent  Representation#39,  3-12-08, 
Permanent Representation#16, 11-07-08). However, the other four struggling states 
have weak state-society relations, so that lacking expertise can hardly be compensated 
through information from business actors, organised interests or NGOs (e.g. Perma-
nent Representation#6, 09-05-08). The group of activity leaders also faces shortcom-
ings in the number of personnel employed in ministries and the permanent representa-
tions, but are not subject to brain drains into the private sector. As a result, the level of 
expertise is higher than in the group of least active member states. In addition, if ex-
pertise on technical matters is not available in the lean ministry itself in Denmark and 
the other very active states, it can most often be substituted by external means. Inter-
viewees  from  Denmark,  Luxemburg,  Ireland,  Belgium,  Sweden  and  Finland  high-
lighted that they have good and very often also institutionalised contacts to the civil 
society. 
In sum, there is tentative support for the first coordination hypothesis because 
administrative working conditions matter for the timely production of national posi-
tions, while the number of involved actors is not important. Also, we find support for 
the  second  coordination  hypothesis,  with  Malta  being  the  only  outlier. States  that 
grapple with shortages of human resources, have problems with the motivation of 
civil servants, or face disrupted administrative working conditions are considerably 
less active.
The learning and legitimacy hypotheses can be tested through a combination of quali-
tative and quantitative methods. This allows combining interview insights on the mo-
tivations to engage in shaping activities and the abilities to do so easily with a broader 
picture on how learning and legitimacy relate to activity levels. 
13 An official stated “We are lacking quite a lot of staff. It’s more or less in all the ministries but in 
some it’s much easier for experts to go to the private sector, because we have so many projects in the 
environment and they can easily change work and they are better paid there. And this is now the big 
challenge in general with the administrative capacity. The economy is going quite well and salaries are 
increasing in the private sector quite rapidly in the last few years. And the administrative capacity is 
weakening, not strengthening, so you just lose people all the time” (Permanent Representation#21, 22-
07-08).21
In order to quantitatively examine the plausibility of the learning hypotheses, 
we use the number of membership  years as a continuous variable and the fact of 
whether a state has already had a presidency (by 2007) as a dichotomous dummy 
variable.  The  operationalisation  of  the  legitimacy  hypotheses  is  based  on  EURO-
BAROMETER-69 factsheets (country reports) from June 2008 to match the time-
frame of the survey that gathered the data for the dependent variable (activities). The 
diffuse support variant is operationalised by the support of EU membership and the 
specific variant of the legitimacy hypotheses by the benefits from EU membership. 
Table 1: Regression results
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1 2 3 4
Duration of Membership 0.123** 0.136***
(0.041) (0.034)
Support EU Membership 0.016 0.082
(diffuse legitimacy) (0.058) (0..050)
Benefit from Membership -0.030 0.010
(specific support) (0.043) (0.046)
Presidency (dummy) 3.507** 4.006**
(1.186) (1.239)
Constant 8.512** 11.022*** 5.187*** 8.672**
(2.816) (2.607) (02.598) (2.929)
Observations 19 19 19 19
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.45 0.42 0.32
OLS regressions with two-tailed t-tests. *** = p 0.01, ** = p < 0.05, * = p < 0.1.
Empirically we see that learning is indeed very important. As expected, the longer a 
state is a member of the EU, the higher is its activity score (models 1, 2). This effect is 
significant and robust. In line with that an official stated: “for old states it is easier to 
form and defend a position. New states are less experienced” (Permanent Representa-
tion #1, 10-04-08). Similar another interviewee argued “And of course the other thing 
is that yes, we’re new, we’re a new member state and we have a lot to learn so obvi-
14 Due to the low number of cases, the models are kept parsimonious and do not include a broader 
range of alternative explanations. However, in separate models, I also tested the learning hypotheses 
and the legitimacy hypotheses respectively against the role of voting and economic power. The find-
ings on the importance of learning and the non-importance of legitimacy did not change. Also, political 
and economic power did not significantly and not robustly influence the activity level of small states. 
While all small states struggle with limited hard power resources, they do not simply reproduce hard 
bargaining power disparities in the usage of counterbalancing strategies. Irrespective of the level of po-
litical and economic power, small states are more active the longer they are members of the EU and if 
they had have the office of the Presidency. The effect of human resources (motivation, ownership, civil 
society contacts, stability of working conditions) cannot be tested quantitatively, since the quantifica-
tion of the independent variables of both hypotheses would either require compound indicators (requir-
ing weightings of the individual components) or loose crucial information.22
ously we’re not that active as perhaps we’ll be in a couple of ages or as other older 
member states with more experience” (Permanent Representation#17, 17-07-08).
15
The effect of the Presidency is also strong (models 3, 4). If states already held 
the office of the Presidency, they are significantly more active than states that did not 
make this experience. Interviews conducted in the 19 Permanent Representations lend 
also strong support for both learning hypotheses. For example, an official from an old
state stated: “if you had the Presidency, this helps you afterwards as well. You have a 
better overview of what is going on, a better network, more self-confidence since you 
can work under high stress and pressure, you are more alert, and it also improves your 
negotiation skills” (Permanent Representation#2, 10-04-08). Similarly another official 
from a state that has not yet held this office argued that “it makes a difference of 
whether a member had the Presidency already. You built up expertise and networks” 
(Permanent Representation#38, 2-12-08).
The regression analysis does not support any of the legitimacy hypotheses, since none 
of the effects is significant and since the signs do not point in the expected direction in 
all but one model. If we look at the role of diffuse support, model one and three indi-
cate that there might be a slight tendency among the small states (although not statis-
tically significant) that those members with higher levels of EU support tend to more
actively use counterbalancing strategies. Yet, we expected that governments of states 
with high levels of EU-scepticism are more inclined to engage in shaping activities in 
order to avoid unpleasant outcomes. However, no interview-based evidence supports 
the role of general EU support for shaping aspirations.
16
The quantitative results on specific support are not in line with the second le-
gitimacy hypothesis either. The models (2, 4) show no robust findings, since the sign 
is not constantly positive. Perceiving EU membership as very beneficial for their own 
state only translates into high shaping activities in Ireland, but not in Slovakia, Esto-
nia, Lithuania and Greece. The qualitative results for the specific support hypothesis 
do also not confirm our expectations. None of the interviewed activity leaders men-
15 Similarly “new small states often have limited experience in Brussels and that this has implications 
for knowledge on new legislations. It probably takes a bit more experience to become pro-active.” 
(Permanent Representation#9, 29-05-08).
16 “We have been regarded as quite sceptical …. This is partly justified. So it’s not a natural thing that 
we have in the recent years been in the centre of gravity in the cooperation within the EU” (Permanent 
Representation#9, 29-05-08).23
tioned specific gains as motivating factors behind their high activities and none of the 
activity strugglers emphasized that it is not worth investing time and energy in shap-
ing activities since specific successes are unlikely anyhow. Rather, the general percep-
tion among small states’ delegates is that if issues “are really top top political inter-
ests, I think we were able to get them across. But as an average, I think there’s a lot of 
room for improvement of course.” (Permanent Representation#17, 17-07-08).
In a nutshell, while we find strong support for both learning hypotheses and also for 
the first and to a more limited extent for the second coordination hypothesis, legiti-
macy considerations do not influence the activity levels of small states. States that 
have been members for a while and that had the Presidency as well as states with sta-
ble administrative working conditions and high expertise are more active.
VII. Conclusions
After the latest rounds of enlargement, the EU consists of many more small than big 
member states. Size differences can translate into three types of structural disadvan-
tages for small members in shaping EU policies according to national interests. Com-
pared to their bigger counterparts, small states have lower shares of bargaining and 
voting capacities. In addition, their argumentative powers are limited, not the least due 
to their more limited financial capacities. Against the background that structural shap-
ing disadvantages might have negative consequences for the EU’s legitimacy and ef-
fectiveness, this paper examined small states. Alongside the three power dimensions, 
it identified six strategies. Limited bargaining power can be offset through regional 
coordination and through bilateral partnerships to bigger members. Contacts to the 
Commission and prioritization strategies can counteract argumentative power short-
comings and help to develop high quality arguments. Disadvantages in moral power 
can be compensated by using the Presidency as an opportunity to pursue own interests 
within the broader agenda or in acting as alleged ‘impartial mediators’ in the Council. 
Thus, small states face three types of disadvantages vis-à-vis bigger states, but have 
no tied hands in uploading national policies to the EU level. 
Based on a comprehensive survey, this paper showed that there is considerable 
variation in the activity levels of small states, while the policy variation is very lim-
ited. Most strikingly, Denmark, Luxemburg, Ireland, Belgium, Sweden and Finland
are the most active, while Cyprus, Bulgaria, Greece, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta are 24
the least active. In order to explain these differences, the paper presented six hypothe-
ses on learning effects, coordination capacities, and the role of legitimacy. 
The empirical test showed, firstly, that learning is indeed crucial. The longer 
states have been members of the EU, the more active they are, not the least because 
transaction costs for applying argumentative, bargaining-based or moral and institu-
tional counterbalancing strategies are lower than for newer member states. In addition, 
having held the office of the Presidency, states experience the diplomatic learning 
curve during which they built up knowledge and networks allows them to more easily 
conduct all three types of counterbalancing strategies afterwards. In line with that, old 
member states and those states that already had the Presidency tend to be more active 
than new member states which have not yet held the Presidency.
Secondly,  coordination  capacities  matter  as  well  because  they  influence 
whether states can develop high quality positions in time for the beginning of working 
group negotiations. If instructions arrive never or too late, the activity level of states is 
low, since many points are already resolved in advanced stages of negotiations and 
won’t be reopened for the latecomers so that there is no point for the delegations to 
apply several counterbalancing strategies. If the quality of instructions is low and the 
positions are too vague, the activity level is also not high, simply because it is either 
uncertain of what exactly should be achieved in the negotiation setting or it is clear to 
the delegation that they cannot achieve the ideal position anyhow. For the timely pro-
duction of high quality positions, human resources and administrative working condi-
tions are crucial. States, such as Denmark, Luxemburg, and Ireland, with well trained 
and experienced experts, highly motivated bureaucrats, cultures of responsibility and 
ownership are much more active in shaping EU policies according to their interests 
than states like Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, and Cyprus who struggle with problems 
of lacking knowledge about the EU, insufficient expertise, brain-drains into the pri-
vate sector, insufficient contacts to organised interests and NGOs  as well as organisa-
tional reshufflings in the ministries. Compared to human resources, institutional fea-
tures such as the number of involved actors cannot account for delays in the prepara-
tion of positions and.
Thirdly,  diffuse  and  specific  support  do  hardly  influence  the  frequency  to 
which  states  rely  on  counterbalancing  bargaining-based,  argumentative,  and 
moral/institutional strategies. With the exception of Denmark, states with less positive 
general attitudes towards the EU are not significantly more active. Specific support is 25
also no strong motivation underlying decisions of involved small states actors to en-
gage in shaping activities. 
This paper showed that small states all face structural disadvantages in shaping 
European policies according to their interests, because they all have fewer votes in the 
Council of Ministers and tend to have less financial resources and less economic bar-
gaining capacities. This does result in shaping advantages for big states: “It is evident 
that greater member states are more influential. That’s just logical because if there is 
qualified majority, twenty-nine votes from one big member state mean votes of five or 
six of a small member states. So from this point of view yes, it’s just a logical conse-
quence” (Permanent Representation# 28, 19-08-08). Nevertheless, small states are not 
deemed to be inactive in negotiations beyond the nation-state, since they can recur to 
a variety of strategies to make their voice heard. Some countries, in particular old 
member states with expertise and smooth coordination procedures, are more active in 
trying to shape outcomes than others, however. This gives rise to the expectation that 
small states can punch above their weight in international negotiations – in particular 
if they have been a member of the respective international institution for some time
and if they have good and motivated personnel and no disrupted administrative work-
ing conditions. 26
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